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The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) identifies federal
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) as agency employees with
expertise in the subject matter they adjudicate.'
Their decisional independence is protected by separating them
from their agency's investigating and prosecuting functions, and they
are accorded protections in hiring, salary, and tenure.2 They function
pursuant to the APA and their own agency's rules.
As of June 2009, twenty-nine federal agencies employ 1,413
ALJs with the Social Security Administration employing 1,166, or
82.5% of that total.' The U.S. Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) sets the qualifications and administers the selection and
employment of ALJs.' Agencies interview and appoint as many
ALJs as are necessary to hold hearings required to be conducted in
accordance with the APA, selecting from OPM's register of qualified
candidates. 6 Of significance to this article, ALJs from one agency
may be assigned to hear cases temporarily for other agencies when
1. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 550-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105,
3305, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2006).
That Act contemplated the existence of impartial factfinders,
with substantive expertise in the subjects relevant to the
adjudications over which they preside, who would be insulated
from the investigatory and prosecutorial efforts of employing
agencies through protections concerning hiring, salary, and
tenure, as well as separation-of-functions requirements. The
decisions of such impartial factfinders were made subject to
broad review by agency heads to ensure that the accountable
appointee at the top of each agency has control over the
policymaking for which the agency has responsibility.
Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS),
57 Fed. Reg. 61759, 61760 (Dec. 29, 1992). Congress terminated ACUS by Pub.
L. No. 104 - 52, 109 Stat. 480 (Nov. 19, 1995). However, the Omnibus
Appropriations Act, 2009 authorizes $1.5 million in start up funds for ACUS. See
Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524, 656 (Mar. 11, 2009). See also 5 U.S.C. §§ 554
(a)(2), (d), 556(a)(3), (c) (2006) (referring to the administrative law judge as the
"presiding employee").
2. Id. See also 5 C.F.R. §§ 930.201-930.211 (2009).
3. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2006).
4. OPM STATUS REPORT ON ALJS BY AGENCY AND LEVEL (June 2009).
5. 5 C.F.R. pt. 337 (2009); 5 C.F.R. §§ 930.201-930.21 (2009).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2006).
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caseloads warrant and with the approval of OPM.7 To further ensure
AU decisional independence, agencies may not rate an AU's job
performance or grant any monetary, honorary, or incentive pay.8
ALJs are paid out of agency funds, but OPM sets AU pay.9 Finally,
agencies may remove ALJs "only for good cause established and
determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board on the record after
opportunity for hearing before the Board."' 0
I. ONGOING DEBATE
Despite these protections to ensure decisional independence, AU
impartiality has been questioned for decades because the perception
is that ALJs, employed by their agencies, cannot be truly independent
or impartial." These complaints have led to the notion that ALJs
who are not in a separate corps or a centralized hearing panel are
biased in favor of the agency simply because they are hired and paid
7. 5 U.S.C. § 3344 (2006); 5 C.F.R. § 930.208 (2009).
8. 5 C.F.R. § 930.206 (2009).
9. 5 C.F.R. § 930.205 (2009).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006); 5 C.F.R. § 930.211 (2009); and 5 C.F.R. §§
1201.121-1201.148 (2009).
11.
Administrative law judges sometimes have trouble proving their
neutrality and independence because the agency for which they
work is often directly involved in the cases they handle. Some
agencies insist on having administrative judges who once worked
for the agency, and such "inbreeding" tends to raise doubts about
the judges' independence.
Robert Pear, Administrative Law Judges are Washington's Potent Hybrid, THE
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1980, at 3. Martin Tolchin, The Nation: In Federal
Departments; Are Judge and Agency Too Close for Justice?, THE N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
5, 1989, at 3. See also Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco - A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L.
REv. 57 (1979). Edward J. Schoenbaum, Improving Public Trust & Confidence in
Administrative Adjudication: What an Administrative Law Judge Can Do, 21 J.
NAAU 1 (2001). For a more comprehensive discussion of the origin and history of
federal administrative law judges see Daniel J. Gifford, Federal Administrative
Law Judges: The Relevance of Past Choices to Future Directions, 49 ADMIN. L.
REv. 1 (1997).
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by the very agency for which they adjudicate cases.12 However, this
notion is essentially an appearance issue since the APA ensures that
agencies cannot raise or lower AU pay based on decisions or
performance.13
The debate has affected state ALJs as well.14 In response, most
states and three major cities have moved the AL's function from
agencies to central panels of administrative adjudication.' 5 However,
similar efforts to establish a totally separate corps of ALJs at the
federal level have not been successful.' 6 While the intent was to
provide greater independence for ALJs as well as generate significant
cost savings, agency concerns over loss of policymaking control and
12. Edward J. Schoenbaum, Improving Public Trust & Confidence in
Administrative Adjudication: What an Administrative Law Judge Can Do, 21 J.
NAALi 1, 6 (2001).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2006); 5 C.F.R. §§ 930.201-211 (2009).
14. See, e.g., Terrance R. Harders, Striking a Balance: Administrative Law
Judge Independence and Accountability, 19 J. NAALJ 1 (1999); John W.
Hardwicke, The Central Panel Movement, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 419 (2001).
15. Duane R. Harves, Making Administrative Proceedings More Efficient and
Effective: How the ALJ Central Panel System Works in Minnesota, 65 JUDICATURE
257 (1981). More than half of the states (twenty-seven), plus the cities of New
York and Chicago, as well as the District of Columbia have moved the
administrative law judge function from the adjudicating agency to a separate
agency created solely for the purpose of adjudication. Those separate agencies are
referred to as a Central Panel (CHP), Central Hearing Agency (CHA), or Office of
Administrative Hearings (OAH). Those states and cities are: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, California, City of Chicago, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York City, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary,
http://www.naalj.org.panel.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2010). The concept of
severing hearing functions from departments and agencies and vesting them in a
single adjudicative entity is commonly referred to as the creation of a "central
panel." Peter L. Plummer, Administrative Law: The State Office of Administrative
Hearings and Rules, 85 MICH. BAR J. 18 (2006).
16. For example, between 1983 and 1993, from the 98th to the 103rd
Congress, Senator Hugh Heflin introduced six bills to establish a separate corps of
federal ALJs known as the "Administrative Law Judge Corps Act." S. 1275, 98th
Cong. (1983); S. 673, 99th Cong. (1985); S. 950, 100th Cong. (1987); S. 594,
101st Cong. (1989); S. 826, 102nd Cong. (1991); and S. 486, 103rd Cong. (1993).
There have been other initiatives as well but none was enacted into law.
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loss of their ALJs' expertise, among other things, prevented any
initiatives from being enacted into law.'
The debate on centralizing federal administrative adjudication is
ongoing and not likely to be resolved in the near future, at least on a
theoretical level.' 8  There are several agencies with ALJs that
adjudicate cases for other agencies, but pursuant to agency specific
legislation.19 Meanwhile, ALJs continue to suggest improvements in
due process administrative adjudication that would further advance
independence for ALJs.20  ALJ independence has its limits simply
17. 131 Cong. Rec. S5235 (1985) (statement of Senator Heflin); 139 Cong.
Rec. S16567 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993) (Letter from Robert B. Reich, Secretary of
Labor).
18. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Unified Corps of ALis: A Proposal to Test the Idea
at the Federal Level, 65 JUDICATURE 266, 275 (1981).
19. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC), the
Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (MSHRC), and the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) are independent agencies that hear cases
brought by the Department of Labor (for OSHRC and MSHRC) and the Federal
Aviation Administration (for NTSB) respectively. Also,
The Office of Hearings [of the U.S. Department of
Transportation] is composed of administrative law judges, who
hold hearings under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.
§ 551 et seq.) ("APA") for the Department's Office of the
Secretary (primarily in aviation matters) and the Department's
component modal administrations that need formal APA
hearings, including the Federal Aviation Administration
("FAA"), Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
("FMCSA"), Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA"),
Maritime Administration ("MARAD"), National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), and the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
("PHMSA").
U.S. Department of Transportation, http://www.dot.gov/ost/hearings/ (last visited
Mar. 8, 2010).
20. For more information, see the American Bar Association's Section of
Administrative Law and Practice Report to the President Elect of the United States
2008, entitled "Improving the Administrative Process," which is available at
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/Report, and the Federal Administrative Law
Judges Conference's Report to the President-Elect of the United States, entitled
"Advancing the Judicial Independence and Efficiency of the Administrative
Judiciary," which is available at http://005754d.netsolhost.com/briefingbook.pdf.
However, those improvements do not address ALJs hearing cases from other
5Spring 2010 The Coast Guard Model
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because "administrative adjudicators are . . . employees whose job it
is to help the agency make decisions with respect to individual cases .
. 21 And, ALJs are required to follow agency regulations as
binding authority. 22
II. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
Setting up a centralized corps of approximately 1,500 federal
ALJs to adjudicate cases for twenty-nine disparate agencies
separately staffed with one to 1,166 ALJs can present extraordinary
managerial challenges. 23 That is why "a central panel for smaller
agencies ... makes sense for several reasons, including the desire to
achieve economies of scale. However, this thinking does not apply
equally to all agencies and all situations, especially not to a large
independent agency [with a large number of ALJs]."24
In 1981, Jeffrey Lubbers suggested a pilot program to test the
idea of a federal centralized corps of smaller agencies. 25  He
proposed transferring ALJs from seventeen selected agencies having
fewer than seven ALJs into a separate corps to adjudicate those
agencies or removing Federal Administrative Law Judges from their agencies into
a separate corps.
21. See Harves, supra note 15. See also 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) ("the employee
who presides at the reception of evidence pursuant to section 556 of this title shall
make the recommended decision or initial decision required by section 557 of this
title"); see also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE APA § 7(b)
(1947) (ALJs must comply with agency policies and procedures).
22. "Administrative [law] judges must follow the agency's legislative rules . .
The only true source of their authority is the agency itself, and their judgment
must be informed by the agency's [judgment] ... an important distinction between
[ALJs] and Article III judges . . ." James E. Molitemo, The Administrative
Judiciary's Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191, 1199 (2006)
(footnotes omitted).
23. OPM Status Report on ALJs by Agency and Level (June 2009).
24. Robert A. Christianson, Symposium: Modern Ethical Dilemmas for ALJs
and Government Lawyers: The Proposal of a Uniform Code of Judicial Conduct
for Administrative Law Judges, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 57, 58 (2002).
25. See Lubbers, supra note 18. Mr. Lubbers is currently Professor of
Practice in Administrative Law, Washington College of Law, American University.
In 1981 he was the senior staff attorney in the Office of the Chairman of the
Administrative Conference of the United States.
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agencies' cases for a period of five years. 26  His plan required
legislation but the efficiencies realized would likely "mute any
opposition . .. since adjudication is not as central to the missions of
most of these agencies as it is to the others." 27 He also suggested
that the entire corps of ALJs could be centralized into separate panels
of specialization. 28 These are excellent ideas, but none was enacted
into law. That leaves us looking for other methods to test the idea on
a small scale without the need for Congressional action.
III. COAST GUARD ALJs
Since the mid-1990s, Coast Guard ALJs have been adjudicating
cases for other agencies on a reimbursable basis.2 9 The Office of
Chief Administrative Law Judge did not seek to test the idea of
centralized administrative adjudication but simply needed to maintain
a sufficient number of ALJs in major port cities throughout the
United States to respond to cycles of surges in Coast Guard cases that
needed adjudication. During periods when there were fewer Coast
Guard cases to adjudicate, its ALJs heard cases from other
agencies. 30
Coast Guard ALJs adjudicate primarily merchant mariner license,
document, and certificate suspensions and revocations. 1 Its ALJs
have varied in number and have been located in major port cities
such as Boston, New York, Norfolk, Jacksonville, New Orleans, St.
Louis, Houston, Long Beach, San Francisco, and Seattle. The Chief
Judge sits in Washington, D.C. Although the number of licensed
26. Id.
27. Id. at 276.
28. Id.
29. Interview with Joseph N. Ingolia, Coast Guard Chief Administrative Law
Judge in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 11, 2008).
30. Id
31. 46 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7705 (2006); 33 C.F.R. pt. 20 (2009); 46 C.F.R. pt. 5
(2009). Merchant Mariners' Licenses, Documents, Certificates of Registry, among
others, are now referred to as Credentials. 74 Fed. Reg. 11196, 11216 (proposed
Mar. 16, 2009) (now codified at 46 C.F.R. § 10.107(b)). Coast Guard ALJs also
hear Class II Civil Penalties assessed under subsection 311(b) of the Federal Water
Pollution control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)) and Class II civil penalties assessed
under section 109 of the comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (42 U.S.C. § 9609(b)).
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merchant mariners has remained at approximately 200,000, the
number of Coast Guard Administrative Law Judges dropped from a
high of sixteen in 1981 to six in 1999 due to a decrease in the number
of cases referred for hearing and new procedural rules which greatly
decreased the necessity for in-person hearings. 32
As the number of Coast Guard cases gradually decreased, there
were periodic surges and contractions in the number of cases referred
for hearing as the result of the agency's shifting priorities.33 This
presented both a problem and an opportunity for the Chief
Administrative Law Judge. With each contraction in the number of
cases, there was an obligation to adjust the number of ALJs
downward.34 Conversely, with each surge in the number of cases,
more ALJs were needed, but it was not practicable to hire additional
ALJs and bring them up to speed only to have the surge be short
lived. And obtaining ALJs from other agencies on a temporary basis
was also not practicable because the time required for a new ALJ to
learn Coast Guard law and procedure would exceed the time required
for additional ALJ services. Therefore, maintaining a sufficient
number of permanent ALJs necessary to meet surges in major port
cities where the Coast Guard had traditionally initiated most
suspension and revocation cases was the best choice. 35
During times when the Coast Guard was referring fewer cases for
adjudication, the Office of Chief Administrative Law Judge would
respond favorably to requests for ALJs to assist other agencies with
cases needing adjudication. 36 The first wave of new cases came from
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
which needed help in adjudicating its commercial fisheries
enforcement cases. NOAA's sole ALJ had retired, thereby creating a
temporary need for adjudicative services that Coast Guard ALJs
provided initially through the ALJ temporary loan program under 5
32. Office of Chief Administrative Law Judge Records. There are now six
ALJs plus one Chief Administrative Law Judge authorized for New York, NY;
Baltimore, MD; Washington, D.C.; New Orleans, LA; Houston, TX; Alameda, CA;
and Seattle, WA.
33. Interview with Ingolia, supra note 29.
34. Id.
35. Id.
3 6. Id.
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U.S.C. § 3344 (2006) and 5 C.F.R. § 930.208 (2006).3 Coast Guard
ALJs were able to learn quickly the agency's substantive law and
procedural rules to adjudicate these enforcement civil penalty cases.38
Formal, extensive ALJ training was not required. This arrangement
proved satisfactory to both agencies and was eventually made
permanent through legislation and Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) wherein Coast Guard ALJs continue to adjudicate NOAA
cases on a reimbursable basis.3 1 When there are changes in the laws
or regulations, NOAA provides appropriate training to Coast Guard
ALJs.40
Shortly thereafter, the Department of Commerce's Bureau of
Export Administration, now called the Bureau of Industry and
Security, 41 entered into an MOA with the Coast Guard Office of
Chief Administrative Law Judge to have its Export Administration
Act enforcement cases heard on a reimbursable basis by Coast Guard
Administrative Law Judges, with OPM's approval.42 As with NOAA
37. When OPM discontinued this temporary arrangement, NOAA hired an
ALJ. After legislation passed allowing Coast Guard ALJs to hear NOAA cases, the
Coast Guard hired the NOAA ALJ. Office of Chief Administrative Law Judge
Records; Interview with George Jordan, Coast Guard Director of Judicial
Administration in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 11, 2008).
38. Most of NOAA's cases referred to Coast Guard ALJs are brought under
the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. 16 U.S.C. §§
1801 etseq.
39. National Sea Grant College Program Reauthorization Act, § 10, Pub. L.
105-160, 112 Stat. 21, 27 (Mar. 6, 1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1541):
[n]otwithstanding section 559 of title 5, with respect to any
marine resource conservation law or regulation administered by
the Secretary of Commerce acting through the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, all adjudicatory functions
which are required by chapter 5 of title 5 to be performed by an
Administrative Law Judge may be performed by the United
States Coast Guard on a reimbursable basis.
40. Training or briefings from other agencies, if necessary, are provided
during Coast Guard ALJs' annual training conferences.
41. Through an internal organizational order, the Department of Commerce
changed the name of Bureau of Export Administration to Bureau of Industry and
Security, 67 Fed. Reg. 20630 (Apr. 26, 2002).
42. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (2000)
(hereinafter, the Act). From August 21, 1994 through November 12, 2000, the Act
9Spring 2010 The Coast Guard Model
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cases, Coast Guard ALJs were able to learn quickly the agency's
substantive law and procedural rules to adjudicate these enforcement
civil penalty cases, obviating the necessity of additional formal
training.
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the number of Coast Guard
cases decreased once again due to the Coast Guard's greater
emphasis on port safety and security. 43 Meanwhile, Congress created
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).4 Originally
under the Department of Transportation, TSA assumed the day-to-
day federal security screening operations for passenger, air cargo,
and facility security. In 2002, Congress created the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and both TSA and the Coast Guard were
transferred to that new agency.45
Shortly thereafter, the Coast Guard Office of Chief
Administrative Law Judge entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement with TSA wherein Coast Guard Administrative Law
Judges agreed to adjudicate TSA civil penalty cases on a
reimbursable basis, similar to NOAA and BIS.46  TSA currently
refers fewer cases for adjudication because it now has resources in
place to pursue settlement prior to referral.
Pursuant to OPM's request, the Coast Guard Office of Chief
Administrative Law Judge agreed to provide adjudicative services on
a reimbursable basis to the Office of Special Master, Department of
Justice, to adjudicate Victim Compensation Fund claims arising from
was in lapse. During that period, the President, through Executive Order 12924,
which had been extended by successive Presidential Notices, the last of which was
August 3, 2000 (3 C.F.R. pt. 397 (2001)), continued the regulations in effect under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706
(2000)) (IEEPA). On November 13, 2000, the Act was reauthorized and it
remained in effect through August 20, 2001. Executive Order 13222 of August 17,
2001 (3 C.F.R. pt. 783 (2002)), which has been extended by successive Presidential
Notices, the most recent being that of August 7, 2003 (68 Fed. Reg. 47833, Aug.
11, 2003), continues the regulations in effect under IEEPA. 15 C.F.R. pt. 700-774.
43. This policy provided that only cases in which the Coast Guard
Investigating Officers sought revocation of a merchant mariner's credentials would
be taken to hearing; otherwise, they would be disposed of through settlement unless
impracticable. Interview with Jordan, supra note 37.
44. Aviation and Transportation and Security Act, Pub. L. 107-71, 115 Stat.
579 (Nov. 19, 2001).
45. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002).
46. 49 C.F.R. pt. 1515 (2009).
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the September 11, 2001 attacks. This arrangement was temporary
and involved only one Coast Guard ALJ who heard cases in New
York City from the summer of 2003 to the end of the program in
June 2004.47
In 2004, per MOA between the Coast Guard and Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), Coast Guard ALJs began hearing customs
brokers' license suspension and revocation cases with OPM
approval.48 CBP did not request that Coast Guard ALJs undergo any
formal training and, so far, has referred only a few cases for
adjudication.
In 2006, the Coast Guard ALJs assumed duties as fact finders for
the hydroelectric dam licensing renewal process administered by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) through NOAA's
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). 4 9  Because the
substantive law and procedural rules were new, NMFS provided the
initial training to Coast Guard ALJs and legal support staff. So far,
two cases have been referred to the Office of Chief Administrative
Law Judge for resolution.
47. The Air Transportation Safety and Systems Stabilization Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (Sept. 22, 2001), established the September 1Ith
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001. According to the Final Report of the Special
Master, 2004, the Fund distributed over $7.049 billion to survivors of 2,880
persons killed in the September 11th attacks and $1.053 billion to 2,680 individuals
who were injured in the attacks or in the rescue efforts conducted thereafter. The
average award for families of victims killed in the attacks exceeded $2 million and
the average award for injured victims was nearly $400,000. For details on how the
claims adjudication hearing procedure worked, see Notice of Inquiry and Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 66 Fed. Reg. 55, 901 (Nov. 5, 2001); Interim Final
Rule with Request for Comments, 66 Fed. Reg. 66274-01 (Dec. 21, 2001); Final
Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 11233 (Mar. 13, 2002).
48. 19 C.F.R. pt. 111, Subpart D (1998).
49. On August 8, 2005, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58,
119 Stat. 594, was enacted. Section 241 of that Act amends sections 18 and 4(e) of
the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. Chapter 12. Section 241 provides parties a right
to an expedited ninety day trial-type hearing before an AU on disputed issues of
material fact concerning prescriptions or conditions proposed for licensing
renewals in hydroelectric dam projects. See 50 C.F.R. pt. 221 (2008). ALJs from
the Department of Interior (43 C.F.R. pt. 45) as well as the Department of
Agriculture (7 C.F.R. pt. 1, Subpart 0 (2009)) also serve as fact-finders for
prescriptions concerning subject matter within the jurisdiction of their respective
agencies.
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Through another MOA, Coast Guard Administrative Law Judges
are now adjudicating within-agency reviews/appeals from applicants
denied Transportation Workers Identification Credentials (TWIC)
and Hazardous Material Endorsements (HME) by the Transportation
Security Administration.5 0 There have been a few hearings but most
of these cases are adjudicated "on the record" without the need for an
in-person hearing.
In 2009, the Office of Chief Administrative Law Judge entered
into an MOA with the DHS Office of General Counsel which
provides that Coast Guard ALJs will adjudicate cases for all DHS
headquarters, offices, and any DHS component on a reimbursable
basis. This agreement supersedes the TSA and CBP agreements.
The DHS and its agencies still enter into inter/intra-agency
agreements that incorporate the main Memorandum of Agreement,
detail accounting data for billing purposes, and provide any further
specifics of the work requested.
Most cases from requesting agencies referred to Coast Guard
ALJs for adjudication eventually settle. Of those that go to hearing,
very few have been remanded and none has been reversed so far.
The requesting agencies have provided training to Coast Guard ALJs
as needed. All requesting agencies require that Coast Guard ALJs
apply the agency's substantive law and procedural rules. Cases are
appealed pursuant to the agencies' rules for final agency action.
IV. AGREEMENTS WITH REQUESTING AGENCIES
The MOAs referred to above typically provide that the requesting
agencies agree to forward hearing requests and associated documents
to the Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center in Baltimore, Maryland,
provide adequate copies of prior ALJ decisions and appellate cases,
and inform the Coast Guard Office of Chief Administrative Law
Judge when ALJ decisions are appealed. The requesting agencies
50. Final Rule, Request for Comments, Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) Implementation in the Maritime Sector; Hazardous Materials
Endorsement for a Commercial Driver's License, 72 Fed. Reg. 3492, 3499, 3500,
(proposed Jan. 25, 2007) (codified at 49 C.F.R. § 1515.11 (2007)).
51. Memorandum of Agreement between DHS Office of General Counsel and
USCG Office of Chief Administrative Law Judge (Apr. 14, 2009).
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may also agree to advise and/or provide training to Coast Guard
ALJs upon changes in the law or regulations.
The Coast Guard Office of Chief Administrative Law Judge
agrees to control and docket each assigned case in accordance with
the requesting agency's appropriate procedural regulations; enter the
case information into a database system; maintain accurate paper
files; track the status of the cases; inform the parties of the presiding
ALJ; forward the case files to the assigned ALJ; render decisions and
forward the same to the parties and the agency; provide prescribed
periodic billing statements; issue monthly case status reports; and
forward closed case files to the agency, among other things. 52
Of course, the requesting agency also agrees to reimburse the
Coast Guard (servicing agency) for the costs of adjudication. All
MOAs provide that Coast Guard ALJs shall follow the procedural
rules and case law of the requesting agency. However, the DHS
MOA provides that in the absence of any specified procedural
regulations on the part of a DHS component, the Coast Guard's
procedural rules in Part 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations may
be used; finally, the MOAs provide that they will remain in effect
unless terminated by either party, upon appropriate notice.53
The separate inter/intra-agency agreements (sometimes called
reimbursable agreements) are based on the MOAs and are entered
into each year between the requesting agency and the Coast Guard
Office of Chief Administrative Law Judge. These agreements
address specific requirements for billing and accounting data such as
personnel, travel, and court reporting costs, as well as administrative
expenses.54
Agency personnel with whom the Office of Chief Administrative
Law Judge's management team negotiates and manages agreements
for adjudicative services are separated and function apart from
personnel involved in the prosecutorial, investigative, and appellate
functions.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Memoranda of Agreement and inter/intra-agency agreements or
reimbursable agreements are authorized under 31 U.S.C. § 1535 and the particular
agency's statutory and regulatory authority for transferring funds.
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V. AGENCY POLICYMAKING AND EXPERTISE
Since Coast Guard ALJs must follow the requesting agency's
laws and regulations, the MOAs may require the requesting agency
to provide briefings or training. Regardless, requesting agencies
have always responded favorably to the Office of Chief
Administrative Law Judge's infrequent requests for training on
specific matters concerning the agency's laws or regulations.
Training for Coast Guard ALJs occurs on an as-needed basis, usually
once per year, with all ALJs meeting over a period from two to four
days. Most of the training is devoted to Coast Guard suspension and
revocation law, with the remainder of the training time devoted to
other agencies.
Coast Guard ALJs apply a variety of substantive laws and
procedural regulations to a mix of cases from various agencies. As
Mr. Lubbers said, "there is no reason why administrative law judges .
. . should not be able to preside over a mix of cases as varied as
federal district or state court judges . . ." 55 The experience of Coast
Guard ALJs adjudicating cases for other agencies is consistent with
this opinion. While there have been occasional remands or partial
remands, the author is unaware of any reversals by the requesting
agencies.56
VI. INDEPENDENCE
When Coast Guard ALJs adjudicate cases for other agencies, they
are identified as "Administrative Law Judge" or as "Administrative
Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard," not as the Administrative Law Judge
of the other agency. Titles, per se, may trigger a fear in the
respondent that the trier of fact is part of the agency that investigates
and prosecutes the action and is, therefore, presumptively biased.
These signs and symbols are the first indicators to respondents that
the person adjudicating their case is not part of the same agency that
55. Lubbers, supra note 18 at 275.
56. As an adjudicator of adversarial cases referred by the requesting agencies,
it would not be appropriate for the author to comment on whether the requesting
agencies are satisfied with this arrangement. Coast Guard ALJs achieve a greater
sense of independence and requesting agencies achieve cost savings while
maintaining policy making control.
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is bringing the action against them, thereby promoting an appearance
of independence.
Another sign and symbol is the ALJ Docketing Center which
serves as the "clerk of the court" for all cases that Coast Guard ALJs
adjudicate. Agencies forward cases to be adjudicated to the
Docketing Center for docketing and ALJ assignment. Upon
completion, the Docketing Center returns the case file to the agency.
In addition to the requesting agency benefiting by having Coast
Guard ALJs adjudicate its cases, Coast Guard ALJs also benefit by
adjudicating a variety of cases, thereby providing a greater sense of
professionalism and intellectual stimulation. It also reinforces the
independence provided by the APA because Coast Guard ALJs are
further separated from the agencies for which they are adjudicating
cases.
VII. COST SAVINGS
The cost-benefit to the requesting agencies is savings realized by
not having to employ ALJs. For example, NOAA brings commercial
fisheries enforcement cases throughout the United States. It would
not be cost effective for NOAA to maintain full-time ALJs in major
fishing port cities because its case adjudication history would not
support such high levels of ALJ staffing. By using Coast Guard
ALJs located in the same regions where NOAA initiates its cases,
NOAA can take advantage of economies of scale by utilizing an
existing ALJ infrastructure, complete with centralized docketing
center, attorneys, administrative staff, and ALJs disbursed throughout
the United States.
The yearly budget for the entire Coast Guard Office of Chief
Administrative Law Judge is approximately $4 million, with $3
million devoted to salaries and the remainder to operations and rents.
Other costs, such as computer and personnel support, as well as some
office spaces, are part of Coast Guard general funding.57 Estimates
based on historical caseloads reflect that costs to establish an ALJ
office at NOAA would be approximately $1 million annually and for
TSA, approximately $2.5 million annually. 8 The costs for one ALJ
57. Office of Chief Administrative Law Judge Records.
58. Id.
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office with two attorneys/law clerks and two paralegal specialists is
estimated at $600,000 to $620,000 per year in salary and $100,000 to
$150,000 in expenses. For two ALJs and a five person staff of three
attorneys and two paralegal/administrative staff, the salary cost is just
under $1 million.5 9
According to cost figures compiled by the Coast Guard Office of
Chief Administrative Law Judge, for every year Coast Guard ALJs
adjudicate cases for other agencies, those agencies individually save
from approximately $1 million to $2.5 million in ALJ staffing costs,
less reimbursement.6 o Based on $196,000 in reimbursement costs
charged back to NOAA in fiscal year 2008, NOAA's savings still
came to $804,000 for commercial fisheries enforcement adjudication.
Counting reimbursement costs in the amount of $3,300 for
NMFS/FERC which was also charged back to NOAA, the total net
savings for NOAA in fiscal year 2008 amounted to $800,700.61
Fiscal year 2008 reimbursable costs to BIS were $45,700.62
Assuming BIS maintained at least one ALJ and staff as described
above, its costs would amount to approximately $1 million per year.
By having Coast Guard ALJs adjudicate BIS cases, that agency saved
approximately $954,300.63
Based on a $2.5 million estimate for TSA to maintain ALJs and
staff to handle their caseload, reimbursement costs for TSA civil
penalty cases were $110,512 for fiscal year 2 0 0 8 .6 Coast Guard
ALJs recently started adjudicating TWIC and HME cases and the
reimbursement costs for those cases was $22,800. TSA's fiscal 2008
net savings realized by having Coast Guard ALJs adjudicate all of
59. Id. These costs assume no computer resources.
60. According to Coast Guard Office of Chief Administrative Law Judge
Records, reimbursements include salaries and employer's contributions for
paralegal specialists, attorneys, and judges. Reimbursements also include travel
expenses but do not cover the costs of office space and supplies, computer systems,
and other fixed costs associated with an agency establishing and maintaining its
own Office of Administrative Law Judges. The Coast Guard assumes those fixed
costs.
61. Coast Guard Office of Chief Administrative Law Judge Records.
62. Id
63. Id
64. Id
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their cases is approximately $2.4 million for their civil penalty cases
as well as for their TWIC and HME cases.6 5
When agencies settle cases prior to referring them to the ALJ
Docketing Center, the agency is able to achieve further cost savings
and efficiencies because no ALJ resources are triggered. All
agencies for which Coast Guard ALJs adjudicate cases attempt to
settle cases as early in the process as practicable to save time and
costs.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In the absence of further Congressional action on centralizing
administrative adjudication, the Coast Guard ALJ model shows that
on a smaller scale, a servicing agency's ALJs can achieve greater
independence. More importantly to the requesting agency, it can
achieve significant cost savings and still retain policymaking control.
Coast Guard ALJs apply a wide variety of substantive law and
procedural rules in adjudicating diverse cases, giving further
credence to Mr. Lubbers' claim that "there is no reason why
administrative law judges . . . should not be able to preside over a
mix of cases as varied as federal district or state court judges." 66
Presiding over a mix of cases has resulted not only in a small,
flexible panel of ALJs capable of responding to surges in its own
agency's cases, but also a highly responsive court capable of meeting
the APA due process adjudication needs of other federal agencies
without ALJs.
Other agencies with smaller groups of ALJs may want to consider
following this approach. In addition to providing greater
independence for the servicing agency's ALJs and cost savings for
the requesting agencies, it has the added benefits of broadening the
ALJs' experience and improving job satisfaction.
65. Id.
66. See Lubbers, supra note 18 at 275.
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